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Abstract:
Anti-foundationalism is a central topic in recent legal scholarship. The critical legal studies movement
(CLS) has mounted a strong challenge to the traditional belief that legal materials (constitutions, statutes,
and precedents) determine legal outcomes and constrain judicial decisionmaking. This scholarship has
overlooked, however, the degree to which the debate between traditional legal determinacy and antifoundational indeterminacy is yet another manifestation of a continuous debate in Western thought—one
that has its roots in pre-Socratic rhetoric and philosophy.
My presentation traces the indeterminacy thesis back to the contest of ideas between Protagoras and
Plato. I examine two well-known and related Protagorean notions: first, that two arguments (logoi) are
always set in opposition to one another with regard to every matter and, second, that the rhetorician can
always "make the weaker argument the stronger." I contend that taking these Protagorean notions
seriously—perhaps even more seriously than self-avowed anti-foundationalists customarily do—leads
paradoxically to a modified endorsement of foundationalism that is nevertheless wholly consistent with the
Protagorean project. Calling upon texts by Aristotle, Seneca and René Girard, I focus upon how
fictionality in representations of Platonically conceived Truth reveals a binarization in thought that is
simultaneously untenable and unavoidable.
***
Like other parliamentary democracies, the United States and Canada have as a central legitimating tenet that
their residents live in a society of laws, not men. The idea has an older, metaphysically significant formulation in
an older language: "Non sub homine sed sub deo et lege"— "Not under man but under God and law."1 Critical
legal studies (CLS) a contemporary movement in (or, perhaps more precisely, against) jurisprudence has
challenged the notion of a society of laws.2 Briefly stated, in its most philosophically radical manifestation CLS'
indeterminacy thesis holds that legal doctrine can never determine legal outcomes because every argument in
favour of a particular outcome can be met with an equally valid counterargument. CLS acknowledges as the
source of this tenet the American law professor Karl N. Llewellyn's practice of demonstrating how legal rules
can be seen to cancel each other out when set one against the other. In such works as "Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and The Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed," and The Common
Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, Llewellyn, a central figure in the Legal Realism of the 1920s and 30s, sets
rule against counter-rule in opposing columns of type.3 Llewellyn does not say, and may not have realized,
however, that his method bears striking affinities to the practices of Protagoras and his fellow sophists. These
affinities are a major topic of what follows.
Contemporary though it is, therefore, the CLS challenge to the notion that the law expresses and captures some

transcendental truth (which is just another way of saying that it is ultimately founded upon something other and
better than merely the play of political interests) is actually an old and recurring one. In various periods, various
notions—transcendental or anti-transcendental, foundational or anti-foundational, natural law or positive law—
may enjoy dominance, but a contentious symbiosis remains. The way in which we understand or try to
understand our world ensures that the anti-transcendentalist position can never fully expel its opposite nor rid
itself of what we may call—in an effort to capture the topsy-turvy manner in which concepts are "grounded
upon" what is "above" them—its own unacknowledged "transcendental foundation." By the same token, the
transcendental notion can never fully prevail.
Rhetoric's lesson in all this is, as I hope to develop it below, that binaries, classifications, and definitions, such as
the foundational/anti-foundational binary, can always be made to fail through a selective application of linguistic
pressure brought to bear by assertions that themselves could be challenged if the same focus and pressure were
applied to them. Breaking things down, as I shall, into recurring binaries of rhetoric vs. philosophy, antifoundational vs. foundational—and, in my most tendentious, but not wholly unprecedented move, a "real" of
rhetoric vs. a "fictional" of philosophy—is necessary in order for any discussion to take place (opposition creates
clarity) but also obscures the extent to which seemingly clear oppositions contain elements of their opposite and,
even more basically, the way in which each term in an opposition has its opposite as its founding principle.
Rhetoric, that ancient common ground of literary, legal and (quasi- or anti-) philosophical study is the place from
which the search for fundamental connections between legal and philosophical fictions must begin. Putting
forward the binary "rhetoric vs. philosophy" starts a drawing up of sides, further and related provisional
binarizations, that partake of and extend the principal oppositional force that underlies the disputes between two
camps. Here is a chart of at least one possible, and, I think, rather uncontroversial set of these oppositions; I
shall examine certain of them in more detail below. What I wish to mention now is that, uncontroversial though I
believe this set of oppositions to be, it is also, ultimately, as arbitrary and contingent as every other of my claims
regarding the investigation of this arbitrary and contingent field. After all, I shall end by arguing that both "One
Truth" and "Fiction" can comfortably coexist under the column headed "Philosophy."
Rhetoric

Philosophy

Seeking to persuade

Seeking the truth

Man-made system

"Transcendental foundationalism"

Atheism, agnosticism, secularism

Theism

Positive law

Natural law

What works

What is right

Argument based on "the many" (for every rule
there is a counter-rule)

One truth

Pluralism/relativism (different truths for
different people)

One truth

Judges make law

Judges find law

Legal enactments

Justice

Nothing behind appearances

A "really real," an essence, to which
knowledge must conform

By thinking in the terms of this division, one can break down the debate between CLS and what might be called
"classical" jurisprudential thought. The contemporary debates in jurisprudence take place on the line that divides
the columns headed by "rhetoric" and "philosophy" (or "expressible"/"inexpressible"); they are yet another
instance, another reenactment of on-going conflicts. The jurisprudential world is now divided between
foundationalists and anti-foundationalists. It is in this sense that CLS anti-foundationalism is essentially a
continuation of the rhetorical project of the sophists which began in theological agnosticism and ended by
demonstrating how to make the weaker argument the stronger. "Sophist" is a dirty word in the history of
philosophy (since it is virtually synonymous with "practitioner of rhetoric"'); in some mouths it is also virtually
synonymous with "liar," "opportunist," or "con man." Nevertheless, if one is willing to treat the term sophist as a
descriptive one rather than a pure pejorative—as a description of a group of thinkers expressing a secularism,
relativism and pluralism in thought not unlike that with which we are familiar today (rather than merely those who
are inevitably wrong because Socrates and Plato must inevitably be right) the term loses its menace. Ferdinand
Schiller, with William James one of the founders of Pragmatism, described their "new name for some old ways of
thinking" as merely a reapplication of the method of the sophist Protagoras,4 and Protagoras is the key figure for
the notion of sophistic that I shall describe.5
Protagoras' thought can be summed up by reference to four interrelated ideas that form the basis of antifoundationalism and show its connection to what have always been the basic principles of legal advocacy. In his
essay on rhetoric, Stanley Fish demonstrates the link between the first two of these positions:
The first declares the unavailability (not the unreality) of the gods: "About the gods I cannot say
either that they are or that they are not." And the second follows necessarily from the absence of
godly guidance: "Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are that they are, and of the
things that are not that they are not".... This is not to say that the categories of the true and good are
abandoned, but that in different contexts they will be filled differently and that there exists no master
context (for that could only be occupied by the unavailable gods) from the vantage point of which
the differences could be assessed and judged.6
The first two Protagorean positions in turn lead to the third and fourth, the ones that are virtually synonymous
with the practice of legal argument. It is Protagoras who first stated the principle that I shall refer to by its Greek
name, dissoi logoi: that there are two arguments set in opposition to one another with regard to every matter.7
In this phrase the etymological ancestry, at least, for Schiller and James's Pragmatism could not be clearer.
Matters here are "pragmata" and like 20th century Pragmatism, Protagoras was interested in practical
application. The notion that argument will always generate its equal opposite is a constitutive rule of thought in
dissoi logoi and it leads to the assertion by which Protagoras virtually invented all subsequent legal advocacy. It
was Protagoras, as Aristotle famously complains in the Rhetoric, who promised that he could teach how to
make the worse argument, the worse logos, the better. Aristotle discusses the Protagorean qualities of argument
with an example taken from law, the core of Protagoras' educational project. The mode of argument, and the
attitude of mind that it reveals, are familiar to all present-day lawyers. It is precisely the attitude of mind that
distinguishes "thinking like a lawyer" from, as it were, thinking like a normal human being. Aristotle's complaint
against it emphasizes what he believes to be the error in basing a system with pretensions to truth not upon the

true itself but upon "the probable," "to eikos." In a moment, I shall discuss the significance of the word eikos and
its cognates. For the moment, to emphasize the importance of "the probable" and the number of times variations
upon eikos appear in Aristotle's complaint, I have re-inserted them into the following translation.
For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is
accused of assault and battery, his defence will be that the crime is not eikos; but if he is likely to be
guilty, for instance, if he is strong, it may be argued against that the crime is not eikos, for the very
reason that it was bound to appear eikos. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be
likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally eikota, but the
one is really eikos, the other not...absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what
"making the worse appear the better argument" means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with
the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent eikos not found in any art except
Rhetoric and Sophistic [lit. Eristic].8
Aristotle criticizes Protagoras' method of argument for not leading to the discovery of truth. Following Plato,
Aristotle, at least in this passage, conceives of truth as something that exists "for itself." Truth here is independent
of a human knower; it is beyond the reach of argument, dispute and doubt; it is that about which there can be no
difference of opinion; that which God knows independently of man's knowledge or the human limitations to
knowing. Aristotle, as most of us do, starts from a premise of the "really real" which he wishes to believe is
somehow recoverable: the man in the example either did or did not illegally strike and harm another. Protagoras'
method of argument is a lie because it does not aid in revelation of that prior actual event—precisely half of the
time its purpose is actually to obscure the revelation of that event: if one side, be it prosecution or defense, is
arguing for a just outcome, the other is necessarily arguing for an unjust one. It is a lie, then, as Aristotle defines
truth, that one can make the worse appear the better argument with regard to questions of truth. For Greek
philosophy, all truth aspires to the condition of geometry. What, Aristotle might have asked, is the
counterargument to the statement that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles?9
Protagoras starts from a different premise about the real. For him, there is no such thing as a "really real"—never
mind a fully recoverable one. Granted, the man in the example either did or did not illegally strike and harm
another. No one, however—not even the alleged victim and alleged perpetrator—necessarily knows whether he
did or not. Even if the basic act itself is established or acknowledged, its legality or illegality is something for the
court to determine. Sometimes people may think they know that they are guilty of something, but are merely
unaware of an effective advocate's panoply of defenses.10 Protagoras knows (as does Aristotle, of course) that
reality is not directly revealed to the minds of the judges. Whether the alleged perpetrator is strong or weak may
makes us think in general that he was more or less likely to have committed the crime, but, by definition, each
case must be decided in particular, not in general. "To make the weaker argument the stronger" is as valid a
translation of Aristotle's Greek as is "to make the worse argument the better."11 Dissoi logoi, the Protagorean
theorem of argument, we might say, means that no matter how bad a case looks, no matter how weak a litigant's
position looks, a skillful advocate can always find a way to construct an argument that—at least with respect to
deciding matters on the basis of argument—brings the two sides into parity. After all, even while criticizing
Protagoras for promising to be able to make the worse argument the better, Aristotle acknowledges that this
characteristic is not found in any "art" except rhetoric and eristic. The very fact of Aristotle's writing his Rhetoric
is an acknowledgment that only through rhetoric can practical matters, pragmata such as legal disputes, be
decided.
Dissoi logoi assumes further not only that each term in a binary opposition contains elements of its opposite, but

that it is founded upon its opposite, upon that which it seeks to exclude. Plato and Aristotle each attempted to
refute Protagoras by pointing out the internal contradiction. If, as Protagoras asserted, man is the measure of all
being and anything that any person believes to be true is true, the belief that Protagoras is wrong—that not every
belief is true—is also true. In this, the peritrope or "turn-around," Protagoras is said to undo himself.12
The peritrope and its supposed self-contradiction are related to another one of Aristotle's accusations against
Protagoras: that he violated the law of noncontradiction. The law of noncontradiction, one of Aristotle's three
laws of thought, carries with it more than a millennium's worth of profound philosophical prestige. An accusation
that one has violated it is no small matter. It is, however, precisely a willingness to disregard the law of
noncontradiction—if not, perhaps, so much by violating it as by concerning oneself only with those aspects of
experience that fall outside its application—that makes for the power and flexibility of a Protagorean approach to
social phenomena.
A standard translation puts Aristotle's statement of the law of noncontradiction (Metaphysics, 1005b19-20) this
way: "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same
respect."13 According to Aristotle, those who, like Protagoras, fail to follow the law of noncontradiction end in
absurdity:
But if all contradictions at the same time in the same manner are true, it is clear that everything will
be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall and a man if it is possible both to affirm and to
deny anything about anything, just as is necessary to those who state the argument (lit. "speak the
logos") of Protagoras. Metaphysics, 1007b18-23 (my translation).
Let us assume that Aristotle is right about Protagoras' denying the validity of the law of noncontradiction by
saying two logoi opposed to each other exist regarding every thing. What results? For Aristotle the same subject
cannot be P and not-P; for Protagoras the same subject is always P and not-P—it is because of this that the
sophist and rhetorician is equally able to argue for P or not-P. Aristotle's law is concerned with establishing what
a thing is; as Protagoras' statement regarding the gods demonstrates, however, he is not interested in questions of
ultimate being. To side with Protagoras is not necessarily to say that the law of noncontradiction is wrong within
its own rigidly narrow metaphysical terms of identity of time and respect;14 one might say instead that like the
geometer's ideal circle, noncontradiction is of strictly limited relevance and applicability in the experiential world.
The law of noncontradiction is a filter: for those who consider it a valid minimum criterion for the true, only those
things that successfully pass through it will qualify as truth. Since Protagoras, not concerned with questions of
ultimate truth, assumes experience to be contradictory, statements about that experience will duplicate those
contradictions.15
Avoiding contradiction is not the end—all and be—all of a Protagorean description of experience, and so a
perfectly valid response to the peritrope is to turn it right around again. The practice of dissoi logoi means that
to acknowledge the same data or premises does not prevent one from arriving at the diametrically opposed
conclusion. Does the fact that not everyone accepts dissoi logoi argue for or against its validity when dissoi
logoi itself predicts that the logos denying its validity lies in opposition to the one affirming its validity? How does
one refute the rejection of the law of noncontradiction by pointing out a contradiction?
Seneca well expressed what is Protagoras' positive take on criticism of his position: "Protagoras says that one
can argue equally well on either side of any matter, including the matter itself whether both sides of any matter
can be argued."16 For some to argue that there are not two sides to every proposition is the best proof the
proposition could have. Perhaps the best way to understand Protagoras' assertion, then, is by treating it as

merely a description or prediction of social phenomena. Argument never stops.
Dissoi logoi naturally also predicts an argument against never-ending argument, but it is more effectively made, it
seems to me, as a moral argument rather than a metaphysical one. In The Clouds, Protagoras' "better" and
"worse" argument reappear as characters named "Just" and "Unjust" argument (Dikaios Logos and Adikos
Logos).17 Socrates complained in The Apology that Aristophanes' parody of him in The Clouds was one of the
things that got him in trouble with the Athenian state. Aristophanes' characterization of Socrates is unjust in some
respects, but it is right in raising the question whether there is any difference between the Socratic and
Protagorean simply on the question of argument. The later tradition recorded in Diogenes Laertius, at least, did
not think so. Just after stating that Protagoras was the first to claim that in every matter there are two opposite
arguments, Diogenes adds that Protagoras made use of these in arguing by the method of questioning, a practice
he originated. A little later Diogenes is even more explicit, stating that Protagoras first introduced the "Socratic"
type of argument.18 Socrates may have testified to his scorn for lawyerly traps and rhetorical tricks, but as
Quintilian, that Roman champion of lawyers and rhetoricians knew, practicing lawyers could have no better
model for putting words into witnesses' mouths:
It remains to consider the technique to be followed in the examination of witnesses.... If ... I am
asked to point out a model for imitation, I can recommend but one, namely that which may be
found in the dialogues of the Socratics and more especially of Plato, in which the questions put are
so shrewd [adeo scitae] that although individually as a rule the answers are perfectly satisfactory to
the other side, yet the questioner reaches the conclusion at which he is aiming.19
There simply is no way to conduct argument other than through rhetoric. The Platonic dialogues are full of
passages in which Socrates' disputants accuse him—quite reasonably and legitimately—of all the rhetorical,
sophistic, or eristic tricks that one could possibly employ. Socrates is always "playing with" people, being "ironic"
rather than serious and straightforward, pretending not to understand statements that he must understand
perfectly well. He uses the binary principle, the oppositional principle, in the same way that a sophist does.20 In
argument Socrates out-sophists the sophists because he gets to ask the questions (and, one suspects, because
Plato gets to write both the questions and the answers), Socrates plays the sophists' game better than sophists
do. The difference is that while he, like they, recognizes the inherent constitutive void at the centre of argument
(that since that is equally good at proving either of two things it can never prove either thing) only Socrates stays
on the right side of the metaphysics of morals by appealing to something outside of the system, on the other side
of the line—a transcendent principle of The Good, The Beautiful, The Just, The True, The One, The Divine. The
Platonic emphasis on transfigured states that go beyond or are inexpressible in ordinary language is another
aspect of this: the divine madness of poetic or prophetic inspiration.21 Both Plato and sophistic ultimately have
an anti-rational conception of argument.22 The difference is that sophistic—in this respect somewhat more
rational than the seeming rationalism of Plato—stops at argument. Platonism adds the extra-argumentative
categories, things about which there can be, it says, no argument.
None of the Socratic/Platonic categories works anymore. It is right that they should not. Rhetoric's unraveling of
them, as of everything else, was necessary and complete. But there will be something, if only because there has
to be something. One can believe both that God, as powerful, intelligent, creative Being, does not and never did
exist and believe that mystery and the incompleteness of knowing, the reason that humankind has always created
and believed in gods is as real now as ever and requires articulation. The question, then, is articulation in what
form?

As I mentioned briefly a moment ago, the key binary in the ancient Greek dichotomy between rhetoric and
philosophy distinguishes between the true and the probable. The key term in the binary, the probable, is "to
eikos." "Likely" is a synonym for "probable" in English and one that captures more of the etymological
relationship between eikos and related words: eoika, the adjective "to be like"; eikôn (root of the English "icon")
a likeness, image, or, in Platonic usage, a mental representation.23 These words in turn call up two apparently
distinct verbs, each with the form "eikô." Etymologists trace the words related to the concept "likeness" to a verb
that survives only in a few forms, but that has a hypothesized form identical to a verb meaning "to yield," "give
back," "draw away from" or "retire." The consistency between this and commonplaces of the interpretation of
Platonic thought is almost too good to be true, as if etymology viewed the eikôn as being a "drawing back from,"
as well as a copy of, an original. The last lines of the Timaeus reflect this: the God that is perceivable is an "icon"
of the "Intellect-ible," the noetic.24 In being "like" the truth eikos is not the truth but a falling away from the truth.
In the Platonic system creation itself is only an imperfect copy of perfect Being. Man is in a fallen state and,
eikos, not truth, is what human beings use in resolving the human disputes. Although opposed to Plato in so many
ways, Aristotle in the criticism of Protagoras and eikos quoted above seems to have inherited the position found
in Plato's Phaedrus.
For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters [i.e., things that are just or
good], but for that which is convincing; and that is probability [to eikos]. For sometimes one must
not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely [eikots] to be done, but what was probable
[ta eikota-lit. "probable things"], whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must
always aim at probability [eikos] paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout
the whole speech, provides us with the entire [rhetorical] art.25
But with what I hope is only a slight gesture of etymological sleight of hand, we can slip from the Greek eikos to
the English "likeness" (sound etymological evidence aside, there is, essentially, only an "l" or a lambda between
them) to the German "Gleichnis" and make the connection from a constitutive principle of legal argument to a
constitutive principle of fiction—from probable to parable. The German for parable and the English "likeness"
are, furthermore, even closer than the modern forms suggest. The Old English root of "like" is gelîc and so
recourse to German as the root language of the "simpler" words in English recalls to us the way in which a
parable presents itself as a fictional "likeness" simultaneously concealing and revealing a truth.
But what of the actual English word "parable," its origins and its connections to the theological source from which
it comes and with which, in English, it cannot but be associated? For this there is no better place to look than the
epigraph that, translated, becomes the title for René Girard's Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du
monde.26 The text is Matthew 13:35 and I give the full sentence from which Girard takes the last three words:
Anoix en parabolais to stoma mou, ereuxomai kekrummena apo katabols, I will open my mouth in
parables; I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world (KJV). These few
words and a brief glance a Girard's project contain a remarkable amount of material shedding light upon the
connections linking eikos, truth and parable. First, only in Greek can we see that the statement depends upon a
pun lost in subsequent languages: "in parables," en parabolais/"from the foundation," apo katabols. The move
from parable to foundation, seemingly such a distant one in translation, is, in Greek, merely one of changing
prefixes (and in this case, the prefixes are further prefixed by prepositions, en and apo, that could themselves
serve as prefixes to the operative verb: ball: "to throw"). A parable in Greek is literally something "thrown
alongside" (as one physical object might be thrown alongside another for purposes of comparison); the figurative
meaning of comparison comes from this literal one. A foundation in Greek is literally something "thrown down."
A painfully literal translation would thus be "I will open my mouth in things-thrown-alongside; I will utter forth

things which have been kept secret from the throwing-down." Furthermore, kataball is one of those words that
explicitly declares its own internal binarization, a word with two senses set in opposition to one another: kataball
can mean either "I found, establish" or "I overthrow." Once again, as with icon's meaning of both image and
"drawing back" we come across a coincidence in language and the history of philosophy that is almost too good
to be true: Protagoras is credited with a book that goes by two titles, "Truth" or "Kataballontes,"27 a subtitle
that is generally translated as "The Down-Throwers" (as it is in R.G. Bury's translation of Sextus Empiricus) or as
"Knock-down Arguments" (Thomas Cole's suggestion),28 but that can also be "Foundations." As we have seen
thus far, every foundation, as of a metaphysical or moral system, is also an overthrowing, and even a selfoverthrowing. Every overthrowing is also a foundation.
But from the throwing down of what? This is the second point. The Latin, English, French texts add "mundi," "of
the world," "du monde," but there is no kosmou in the Greek original (the Girard title adds it, but the epigraph
itself does not); it is as if the "throwing-down" or foundation (or "overthrowing") was itself so secret, so
indecipherable, that the thing thrown down cannot be named or loses its full meaning upon naming. Because so
much of this paper has been devoted to attempts to demonstrate the foundedness of anti-foundationalism and the
self-overthrowing of foundationalism, I prefer to leave apo katabols as it is, founded and overthrown in one,
without a cosmos, a world, an ordered thing set up and added in order to "explain" just what it is that was
thrown down. Whoever added the word kosmou—and especially that word—in an effort to name the "what" of
apo katabols is an enemy to my project. The orderedness of things comes not from the foundation, but from the
parables.
What does this epigraph, this title, mean for Girard's discussion of mimesis, in Plato and elsewhere, as the core
principle upon which conflict—that which law seeks to manage—is based? Are we to take his description of the
originary conflicts based upon mimesis as themselves parables, that is fictions, that is mimesis? More basically,
what is the relationship between a fiction and a non-existent (because non-experiencible) but—as I hope I have
demonstrated—necessary and inevitable resort to something beyond the experience, language and argument?
Up until now I have not mentioned Kant or the degree to which all of that which has been said so far is an aspect
of the Kantian quirk in all subsequent metaphysics. This is partially because with Plato and Protagoras we have,
full-strength as it were, the two realms that Kant tries to account for, mediate and reconcile: Protagorean
phenomena and Platonic noumena. As long as the noumena has that definition in metaphysics, and therefore our
habits of thought, of the "truer truth" which can never be known, it is inevitable that all phenomena, that which can
be known (or at least experienced) will be lower, an image, an "icon," only the probable, "like" truth and
therefore not true. The true is, by definition in this scheme, that which God knows and which men cannot know.
Except, that is, in fictions: ordinary, philosophical or legal. Fictions are parables (the religious colouring of the
word is definitely intended) for a real that is not there (in the sense of being necessary but unreachable). Fictions
provide the God's-eye-view to human beings that human beings cannot have in the created world. "Un cercle
n'existe pas," says Roquentin (and Protagoras, and Nietzsche) and he is right as to the question of ultimate
existence, which has always enjoyed a position of privilege in metaphysics. The circle, like God, like Roquentin
himself, is a fiction. But Roquentin (fictionally) knows what a circle is, knows how to conceptualize of one and
knows that, because he and others know how to conceptualize of a thing that can never exist they can do certain
things with the things in existence that they could not do otherwise. Justice is a fiction. Since for every argument
there is a counterargument, no outcome viewed as solely within the rhetorical system of legal or moral argument
can ever be either just or unjust. Only in fictions, be they novels, religious parables, legal hypotheticals or
baseless (that is, necessary) ideals, can we have given to us—precisely because there is no thing-in-existence

referred to—reality as our fictional God would receive it.29 Only in a legal hypothetical, for example, can one
categorically begin, "Say that X is guilty of a crime..." Since X is not in existence, the rhetorical attack of "he is
not guilty of a crime" cannot be mounted. Plato writes against the mimesis of the literary artist as the consummate
literary artist: in such a way as to simultaneously overthrow and found himself. Plato writes fictions because only
in that way can truths be told.

Notes

1. The phrase itself, however, also has an older, slightly different meaning, or at least a slightly different
application. It was probably invoked most famously by Sir Edward Coke as part of his justification for denying
King James I the right to issue legal judgments in his own court of the King's Bench. As Coke used the phrase, it
was not the citizen but the king himself who was "not under man but under God and law." Prohibitions del Roy,
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